







Reputation and State Commodity Promotion: The Case of Washington Apples 
 
 




Selected paper, 2001 American Agricultural Economics Association Meetings 
 
Copyright 2001 by Quagrainie, McCluskey, and Loureiro.  All rights reserved.  Readers may make 
verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this 
copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
 
 
* Quagrainie: Post Doctoral Researcher, Department of Agricultural Economics, Washington State 
University.  McCluskey (corresponding author): Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural 
Economics, Washington State University, Pullman, WA  99164-6210.  Ph. (509) 335-2835, Fax (509) 
335-1173, e-mail: mccluskey@wsu.edu; and Loureiro: Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics, Colorado State University.  The authors wish to thank without implicating Ron 
Mittelhammer and Tom Schotzko for helpful comments.  This work was supported b y the NRI 
Competitive Grant Program/USDA No. 0001853. 




  Reputation plays an important role in assuring product quality in markets where 
consumers can only imperfectly judge the product quality until after consumption.  If reputation 
effects are absent in these types of markets, there is an incentive for producers to reduce quality 
and take short-run gains before buyers catch on.  In order to avoid such quality cutting, products 
with good reputations will sell for premium prices.  Shapiro (1983) showed theoretically that 
price premiums are necessary for producers to invest in reputation.   
There is an extensive theoretical literature on reputation
1, but empirical studies are 
limited.  Empirical studies on the impact of firm reputation on shareholder wealth or product 
demand include Jarrell and Peltzman; Borenstein and Zimmerman; and Karpoff and Lott.  Caves 
and Green showed that factors, which may affect a firm’s reputation, influence the relationship 
between price and quality.  Gorton analyzed how a bank’s reputation for default affects the 
discount rate on its debt. 
  The measurement of the value of reputation to producers in terms of price premiums and 
how a reputation can be built up and destroyed are important issues that have not been 
empirically analyzed.  The current study provides estimates of reputation as a dynamic latent 
variable that is determined by price premiums and market data.  Further, it analyzes the effect of 
extrinsic factors on reputation.  Steenkamp points out that consumers observe, at the moment of 
purchase, the intrinsic and extrinsic product quality cues but not the quality attributes.  Intrinsic 
cues are characteristics of the product such as color, freshness, texture, and flavor, while 
extrinsic characteristics such as price of the product, store, product origin, label, and popularity   2
of the product affect quality perceptions.  Specifically, this study seeks to: (1) quantify the 
reputation of Washington apples over time, (2) study the dynamic nature of reputation, and (3) 
analyze the effect of the label “Washington Apple” on reputation. 
  The objectives of Landon and Smith for their empirical analysis of the effects of 
reputation on the hedonic price of Bordeaux wine are the closest to the objectives of this paper.  
They  used an instrumental variables approach to obtain an expected quality variable in the 
hedonic price equation.  Both firm and collective reputations are used as instruments.  In their 
analysis, reputation is based on average quality ratings divided by the overall quality rating of the 
vintage by the  Wine Spectator  magazine and quality classifications by Parker.  The major 
difference between the approach of Landon and Smith and this paper is that in the current 
analysis, reputation is estimated as a dynamic l atent variable based on price premiums and 
marketing data rather than data provided by expert assessment.  In the current analysis, both a 
latent structure procedure and the hedonic approach are applied to the data, and results from the 
two approaches are compared. 
  Reputation of Washington apples is examined using five major varieties of apples grown 
in Washington, i.e., Fuji, Gala, Golden Delicious, Granny Smith, and Red Delicious.  Testable 
hypotheses are that lagged reputation and the “Washington Apple” logo have no effect on current 
reputation.  Average monthly price premiums and marketing data are utilized in the study.  These 
objectives are achieved using a two-step dynamic multiple-indicator multiple-cause (MIMIC) 
modeling approach (Joreskog and Goldberger), which is a special case of the general latent 
variable modeling scheme called “state-space” models.  Since the second step of the procedure is 
similar to the hedonic price technique, that approach is also applied.   3
  Although the primary purpose of this paper is to quantify reputation and understand its 
effect over time, a secondary contribution of this paper is that it extends the existing literature on 
produce marketing, specifically the marketing of Washington apples.  Another contribution of 
this paper is the introduction of dynamics into the MIMIC framework, which is a significant 
departure from previous work on modeling latent structures with the exception of Richards, Gao 
and Patterson who used a Kalman filter in a dynamic MIMIC framework. 
 
A Structural Latent Model of Reputation 
  From the theoretical literature on quality and reputation, consumers use reputation to 
predict quality and will pay a premium for it.  In order to measure reputation over time, this 
paper uses the MIMIC framework for modeling latent variables based on Goldberger; Joreskog 
and Goldberger; and Aigner et al.  Gertler provides a discussion of profit maximization and 
quality determination and how the MIMIC framework fits into the theoretical literature on 
product quality
2. 
  The MIMIC framework consists of two sets of relationships.  In our MIMIC reputation 
model, the first set, which is referred to as the behavioral equation, describes how reputation 
changes over time and is similar to Shapiro’s (1983) reputation adjustment equation (6).  The 
equation takes the form: 
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where Rt is the latent (unobserved) reputation variable, and the Xt is a k x 1 vector of observable 
variables that determine Rt (i.e., the causes of Rt), and et is an independently distributed random 
disturbance with zero mean and finite variance ) (
2
e s .  In this study the Xt includes the label   4
“Washington Apple” (logo), quarterly dummies to represent seasonality, regional dummies to 
represent regional differences in p erceptions of quality, and apple varieties to determine the 
effect of each variety on reputation.  Equation (1) also assumes that current reputation is a 
function of previous reputation Rt-1
3. 
  Patterson and Richards used a structural latent model to analyze brand attraction, a 
concept that is similar to reputation.  The major difference between these two concepts is that, 
from the theoretical literature, reputation is inherently a dynamic concept while brand 
attractiveness is not. 
  The second set of relationship in the MIMIC procedure is a system of equations referred 
to as measurement equations that purports to measure reputation using observable variables.  It 
consists of m variables yt and takes the form: 
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The yt’s are considered as ‘indicator’ variables that provide the most direct, observable evidence 
of changes in the reputation variable Rt, i.e., they represent manifestations of economic factors 
that the reputation is intended to represent. 
  In terms of observable variables, the reduced form is given by: 
(3)        t t t u G y + P =  
where P = al'; Gt = Rt-1, Xt; and ut = ltet + vt.  There is one measurement equation for each of 
the  m indicator variables, relating values of the indicators to the latent variable, cause 
(predetermined) variables, and a stochastic error term.  The indicators yt’s in (2) are taken to be 
the price premium of Washington compared with non-Washington varieties and subscripts are   5
indexed as follows: Fuji=1, Gala=2, Golden Delicious=3, Granny Smith=4, and Red 
Delicious=5.  
  The reduced form equation, (3) resembles the standard form of a hedonic price regression 
except that in (3), there are five indicator equations, the dependent variables are price premiums, 
and the explanatory variables include lagged reputation.  The hedonic price function assumes 
that the price of a heterogeneous good is a function of the attributes (intrinsic and/or extrinsic) of 
that good.  The formulation is predicated on the assumption that consumers obtain utility from 
consuming the attributes of the good in question, i.e. that these attributes rather than the goods 
per se are the arguments in an individual’s utility function.  If price premiums are used as a 
proxy for reputation, each of the equations in (3) becomes a standard hedonic price regression. 
  The MIMIC procedure is covariance-oriented in that parameter estimates are obtained by 
minimizing the difference between the sample covariance and a fitted covariance matrix.  
Assuming that in equations (1) to (3) E(Xtvt) = 0; E(Xtet) = 0; and E(vtet) = 0; and E(vtvt) = S, 
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when we adopt the normalization  1 ) (
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1 m s s s .  By adopting 
appropriate restrictions on P in (3), Joreskog and Goldberger suggest an indirect estimation 
procedure that they called the  econometric-based a pproach to estimating  P and  W
4.  This 
approach has been used widely in the literature to examine several economic issues (see for 
example Gertler; Gao, Richards and Kagan; Gao, Wailes and Cramer; Patterson and Richards).   6
  The solution to the above problem may be also achieved with a Kalman filter (Watson).  
Recent applications of the Kalman filter algorithm to estimate latent variables in agricultural 
economics include Chavas; Richards, Gao and Patterson; and Tegene. The Kalman Filter 
alogorithm was not chosen for this study because the data set is both cross-sectional and time 
series in contrast to the time series data sets that the Kalman filter is usually applied.  If the 
Kalman filter procedure were applied here, either the mean of the cross section would have to be 
used or the estimation results would not be robust to permutations in the cross section.  
Therefore, an alternative two-step method of maximum likelihood is adopted to estimate the 
latent variable reputation
5. 
  The method of maximum likelihood adopted here is similar to estimating factor loadings 
in factor analysis (see Lawley and Maxwell, p. 10-14).  Assuming that reputation Rt is known a 
priori, which satisfies the restriction P = al', the log-likelihood function of (3) is of the form: 
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where S = (1/n)(y - GP)'(y - GP); and W = ll' + S.  The likelihood function (5) could then be 
maximized to obtain optimal values of the parameters  a,  l, and 
2
i s .  Unfortunately, the 
reputation variable Rt is not known and so lagged reputation Rt-1 is also unknown.  Therefore, the 
estimation procedure to obtain the parameters in (2) and (3), i.e.,  ) , ,..., , , (
2 2 2
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subject to the normalization condition 1
2 = e s , is accomplished in two stages (Spanos).  The first 
stage proceeds by ignoring the parameter restrictions  P =  al' in (3) since it includes the 
parameter a1 on the unknown Rt-1.  The indicator coefficients l and the associated variance 
matrix S are estimated using a Multiple-Indicators (MI) model.  The log-likelihood function is 
expressed as:   7








- W - W - =  
where S1 = (1/n)y'y; and W = ll' + S.  The covariance matrix W is central to the MI estimation 
method.  Estimates of the model parameters are found by maximizing the log-likelihood function 
by choosing values of l and 
2
i s  such that: 




























ii s  is the i
th diagonal element of S1.  Note that (7) and (8) are not closed form solutions for 
the parameters because  l depends on 
2
i s  and vice versa in both equations.  To reduce the 
dimensionality of the numerical search for a maximum of the likelihood function, the likelihood 
function is concentrated by substituting 
2 ˆi s  for 
2
i s  in (6).  Equation (6) is then maximized 
numerically to yield the maximum likelihood estimate of the indicator coefficients l, which is 
substituted into (8) to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of the variances 
2
i s  and thus the 
matrices S and W. 
  To test the null hypothesis that W ˆ  provides the best estimate of the covariance matrix W, 
the test suggested by Lawley and Maxwell (p. 22) is used to test Ho: W = ll' + S against Ha: W „ 
ll' + S.  The likelihood ratio test is of the form: 
(9)      ) ( ~ ] | | ln ) ˆ ( | ˆ | ln [ ) (
2
1 1
1 d m S S tr n d c h - - W + W =
-  
where d = 0.5m(m+1)-2m.  Note that this test procedure is applied when the model is over-
identified as in this study and specifically tests the statistical significance of the covariance   8
matrix, W = ll' + S.  The test statistic may also be used as a test of the restriction P = al' 
against P „ al' and can be used to assess the appropriateness of the indicators chosen. 
  The second step of the MIMIC estimating procedure, uses the estimators of the indicator 
coefficients  l ˆ  and the diagonal matrix  S ˆ  as well as the observations on price premiums yt to 
estimate the reputation R ” (R1,…,Rt)' by minimizing the sum of mean-square errors: 
(10)     
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Spanos shows that this is a Mean Squared Estimator (MSE) of Rt, which is unbiased under the 
normalization  1 '
1 = W
- l l  because, for 
1 ˆ ' t Ry l
- =W ,  ˆ ()0, tt ERRt -=".  Equation (11) is 
used as an estimator of factor scores in the context of factor analysis as a least squares estimator 
when l and S are known (Lawley and Maxwell).  Following Spanos, the operational form of 
(11) is used to estimate the reputation variable R as: 
(12)       
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  With the estimates of R
*, the parameters in equation (1) a are estimated by regressing R
* 
on the cause variables G (Gt = Rt-1, Xt).  We will refer to this as the MIMIC Reputation Model.  
To show that the MIMIC approach is significantly different from a standard hedonic regression, 
the weighted average of the price premiums ?t is used as a proxy for reputation and modeled in 
the hedonic framework, i.e., 
(13)        t t
K
k





~ ~  
We will refer to this as the Hedonic Proxy Model.  The models represented in (6), (12) and (13) 
are estimated using GAUSS 3.5.   9
 
Data 
  Data used are monthly regional market data rather than survey data in order to recover 
the reputation of Washington Apples.  The Washington Apple Commission is the source of the 
data.  The data in its original form is cross-sectional daily observations from a number of cities, 
which spans four years, from July 1996 to November 1999.  It contains observations from major 
cities in every state in the continental United States on five varieties of apples: Fuji, Gala, 
Golden Delicious, Granny Smith, and Red Delicious.  The data include advertised retail prices of 
Washington apples and non-Washington apples, and whether there was a “Washington Apple” 
logo on apples from Washington.  The nation was demarcated into five regions, i.e., Midwest, 
Northeast, Southeast, Southwest and West.  Then the data was averaged across cities per month, 
to obtain average regional monthly series for each variety.  The data utilized in the study thus 
include price premiums of each variety (Washington to non-Washington), variety variables, and 
a logo variable.  The variables, descriptions and summary statistics are presented in Table 1.  
Seasonal and regional variables are also included in the model as [0, 1] dummies. 
 
Results and Discussion 
  Results from the first stage of the estimation procedure are reported in Table 2.  The 
estimates of the five indicator coefficients l corresponding to the five varieties are 0.05, 0.06, 
0.06, 0.05 and 0.16 for Fuji, Gala, Golden Delicious, Granny Smith and Red Delicious 
respectively.  All estimates have positive signs and are highly significant, suggesting that price 
premiums are good indicators of the reputation that consumers have for Washington apples.  The 
results that the indicator coefficients, also called factor loadings, are positive and significant   10
imply that what the indicators have in common is the reputation that we intended to measure. 
Therefore, the measurement of reputation is not likely to be obscured by a wide diversity in the 
price premiums.  The common factor issue suggests that a possible collective reputation effect 
exists (Tirole).  The positive sign on all the indicator coefficients also brings out the 
complementary relationship between these price premiums.  It implies that simple aggregates of 
these price premiums could be used as measures (proxies) for reputation, which could be a 
justification for the second model, the Hedonic proxy model.  Notwithstanding, results from the 
MIMIC reputation model make more intuitive sense and are consistent with the theoretical 
literature on reputation than the results from the Hedonic proxy model. The estimates for the 
corresponding variances, Sii, of the indicator coefficients are also statistically significant (see 
Table 2). 
  Since the MIMIC approach relies on covariance relationships, the statistical significance 
of the fitted covariance matrix W = ll' + S, was tested using equation (9).  The likelihood ratio 
test statistic, h(5) is 1.137 and P-value is 0.951; values that are well within the acceptance region 
of a five percent test, leading us not to  reject the null hypothesis that  W ˆ  provides the best 
estimate of W. 
  Table 3 presents the results from the second stage of the MIMIC reputation model as well 
as results from the Hedonic proxy model.  Results from the reputation model indicate statistical 
significance of eleven out of fourteen estimated parameters while in the Hedonic proxy model, 
nine estimated parameters are deemed statistically significant at the five percent level. 
  We hypothesized that lagged reputation affects current reputation because current 
posterior beliefs about reputation are a function of prior beliefs, i.e., reputation is a dynamic 
concept (Shapiro, 1982, 1983).  As expected, the parameter estimate on the lagged reputation   11
variable is positive and significant, which corroborates theoretical results from Shapiro (1983), 
and empirical findings of Mannering and Winston, and Thomas.  In order to evaluate whether 
reputation is nonstationary, and that shocks to reputation are permanent, we tested whether the 
coefficient on the lagged reputation variable is equal to one.  Based on the results of an F-test 
statistic of 411.8, we reject this hypothesis at the five percent level, which leads us to conclude 
that reputation does evolve over time, and that shocks to reputation are temporary and dampen 
over time.  It also implies that reputation is a stationary time series process.  Similar conclusions 
could be drawn from the Hedonic proxy model since the lagged proxy price premium variable is 
also positive and significantly different from unity. 
  State promotion of different commodities has been used as a marketing strategy to 
differentiate products in order to enhance the reputation of specific states’ agricultural products.  
Early efforts of state promotion include Washington apples, Florida citrus, and Idaho potatoes.  
However, not all the implemented state promotion programs have counted on historical 
reputation as an asset or informational leverage.  As a result, some efforts at promotion of state 
products have been more successful than others.  It appears from the results that the apple 
industry in Washington benefits from built-up reputation from the past. 
  Regarding seasons, all estimates in the MIMIC reputation model are positive and are 
statistically significant except the estimate on the fourth quarter, which is not significant.  The 
parameter estimates on the first, third and fourth quarters are 0.142, 0.188 and 0.078 
respectively, and represent seasonal effects on reputation relative to the second quarter base 
(Table 3).  The fourth quarter of the year is when apples are in season, and the third quarter is the 
period when most of the fruits on sale have been in storage for a long time.  A positive sign for 
the third quarter suggests a positive seasonal effect on reputation relative to the second quarter.    12
Thus, the positive sign on these seasonal parameters reflects consistency in expected quality of 
Washington apples irrespective of the season.  This is consistent with expectations regarding the 
reputation of Washington apples. 
  In the Hedonic proxy model however, the signs on estimated coefficients on the quarters 
reflect more on the trend in apple prices over time.  For example, estimates in the first and fourth 
quarters have negative signs –0.025 and –0.016 respectively, while the estimated coefficient on 
the third quarter has a positive sign 0.018 (Table 3).  All estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant implying that the effects of the first and fourth quarters are negative but the effect of 
the third quarter is positive relative to the base quarter.  These results do not make intuitive sense 
in terms of reputation.  In terms of price trend however, the results make perfect economic sense 
when we consider that the price of apples will be higher as we move away from the apple season.  
Thus, we expect that the coefficient on quarter three will be positive, relative to quarter two and 
similarly, the coefficients on quarters one and four will be negative relative to quarter two. 
  Regional variables were included in the model to capture the regional differences in 
perceptions of quality of Washington apples.  In the MIMIC reputation model, all parameter 
estimates are positive and significant.  The positive sign on the estimated parameters represent 
regional perceptions of quality relative to the western region base.  The Midwest and Southwest 
regions appear to have relatively, higher perceptions of quality for Washington apples compared 
to the Northeast and Southeast regions.  The differences in magnitude of parameters could be a 
reflection of regional identities.  The Northeast, particularly New York and Pennsylvania, 
produces a fair amount of apples and the Southeast, particularly Florida, is the home to the 
production of fruits that could be considered as substitutes to apples. The regional parameter 
differences could also be attributed to differences in transportation and storage costs on price   13
premiums.  In the Hedonic proxy model however, the signs on the estimated coefficients on the 
regional dummy variables are mixed.  Coefficients on the Midwest and Southeast regions have 
negative signs while coefficients on Northeast and Southwest regions have positive signs.  Only 
the coefficient on Southwest is deemed significant. 
  Washington State benefits from the r eputation that its producers grow high quality 
apples.  In recent years, however, there have been industry concerns regarding the declining 
“eating” quality of Washington Red Delicious apples.  This is expected to have a negative effect 
on the reputation of Washington apples and consequently on demand.  The varieties of apples 
included as explanatory variables of reputation include Fuji, Golden Delicious, Granny Smith 
and Red Delicious.  In the MIMIC reputation model, all estimated parameters had a positive sign 
except the coefficient on the Red Delicious.  Estimated coefficients are 1.873, 0.872, 0.12, and –
0.378 for Fuji, Golden Delicious, Granny Smith and Red Delicious respectively (Table 3).  
Given the concerns in the industry regarding declining “eating” quality of the Red Delicious, the 
negative sign is not unexpected though the estimate is not significant at conventional levels.  The 
Fuji and Golden Delicious are found to enhance reputation of Washington apples.  Generally, the 
signs on the estimated parameters in the reputation model are in line with industry expectations. 
  In the Hedonic proxy model coefficient estimates on Fuji and Red Delicious have 
positive signs, 0.03 and 0.354 respectively, but coefficient estimates on Golden Delicious and 
Granny Smith have negative signs,  –0.295 and  –0.138 respectively.  The estimates on Red 
Delicious, Golden Delicious and Granny Smith are statistically significant.  The Red Delicious 
variety is considered the least desirable, and it is surprising to find a statistically significant 
positive estimate in the Hedonic proxy model while the Granny Smith, a more desirable variety, 
is found to have a significant negative coefficient.   14
  The inconsistency in signs on the parameters from the Hedonic proxy model, and the 
apparent lack of empirical interpretations for the parameters corroborate the assertion that 
inappropriate specification of a latent variable invokes “measurement errors” and can seriously 
distort empirical interpretations (Gao, Wailes and Cramer; Patterson and Richards). 
  According to the Washington Apple Commission, the use of the “Washington Apple” 
logo is aimed at increasing consumer awareness of Washington apples and as a signal of quality.  
Therefore, we expected the parameter estimate on this variable t o be positive.  The logo 
coefficient is positive and significant, suggesting its significance for reputation.  The magnitude 
of the effect of the logo variable is relatively large compared to the other cause variables in the 
reputation model.  This strengthens the reasons to use the “Washington apple” logo as a quality 
signal.  The “Washington Apple” logo in its current version has been used by the Washington 
Apple industry on all fresh Washington apples since 1982 as a seal of guaranteed quality. 
  The presence of the logo on fruits and fruit packages only signals origin and does not 
reflect specific quality or production standards.  Some Washington apple producers use their own 
logo in addition to the “Washington Apple” logo to differentiate their apples.  Shipping 
organizations may also have the logo imprinted on the container. There are no rules for quality 
control for Washington producers other than the apples must be grown in Washington State.  
Producers, therefore, have large incentives to produce low quality products and still benefit from 
the collective reputation that Washington has built up over time.  The estimated coefficient on 
logo in the Hedonic proxy model is also positive and significant but the magnitude is relatively 
small when compared to the magnitude of other estimated coefficients in the model. 
  Patterson and Richards (P&R) analyzed the effect of the “Washington Apple” logo on 
apple sales with both a static structural latent model and a LAIDS model.  With the former   15
model, P&R found that the logo had no impact on sales, but logo was positive and significant in 
the LAIDS model.  A possible reason for the different results in the structural latent model of 
P&R and that of this study are that, P&R analyzed the effect of brand attraction on the price 
level, while the current analysis considers the effect of reputation on price premiums.  In 
addition, the latent variable brand attraction of P&R is applied to the entire apple industry, while 
our latent variable reputation applies only to Washington apples, a specific state’s commodity. 
  The estimated constant term in the reputation model is –2.199, which is greater than all 
other estimated parameters, and is strongly significant.  This suggests a declining trend in 
reputation.  An important question is how long can Washington apple producers enjoy a 
reputation for quality if the current trend continues?  With perfect information and perfect 
competition, one would expect consumers to substitute apples from other sources for 
Washington apples if the expected quality falls below consumers’ preferred quality.  However, 
with about sixty percent of all apples grown for the U.S. fresh market originating from 
Washington State, substituting to other apple sources is unlikely.  Instead, if the expected quality 
falls below consumers’ preferred level of quality, consumers will no longer be willing to pay a 
premium for Washington apples. 
  According to the standards currently used by the apple industry (such as size and 
appearance), Washington apples are generally considered the best and are above the USDA 
quality standards.  The problem may be that quality standards need to include some intrinsic 
factors such as taste, texture and flavor.  The apple industry’s emphasis on fruit appearance 
rather than taste, texture and flavor could drive consumers to substitute away from apples to 
other fruits.  Shapiro (1983) points out that minimum quality-standards can influence the 
equilibrium price-quality schedule so that for consumers’ expectations of quality to be fulfilled,   16
it can be desirable to impose a minimum standard.  In order to maintain its good reputation, the 
apple industry in Washington should consider establishing minimum standards for what 
constitutes “eating quality” in addition to the normal grading.  This may suggest that reputation 
should be considered in any cost-benefit analysis for the industry.  Loureiro and McCluskey 
found that if the protected geographical indications label “Galician Veal” from Spain was present 
on meat products, Spanish consumers were willing to pay a significant premium.  The use of the 
“Galician Veal” label requires producers to be located in the region and also meet very strict 
quality and production practice standards. 
 
Conclusions 
  A dynamic multiple-indicator multiple-cause (MIMIC) framework was used to estimate 
the latent variable reputation with price premiums for Washington apples and attributes that 
covered the period July 1996 to November 1999.  A maximum likelihood two-stage approach 
was employed.  For comparison purposes, a hedonic regression was also estimated. 
  Results from the first stage of the estimation procedure in the MIMIC reputation model 
suggest that price premiums are good indicators of reputation.  The indicator coefficients, also 
called factor loadings, imply t hat the estimated reputation variable is common to the five 
indicators chosen and that the measurement of reputation is not likely to be obscured by a wide 
diversity in the indicators.  The common factor issue suggests a possible existence of collective 
‘Washington’ reputation. 
  Results from the second stage of the MIMIC reputation model are compared to those 
from the Hedonic proxy model.  In general, results from the MIMIC reputation model make 
more intuitive sense and are in line with the theoretical literature on reputation than the results   17
from the Hedonic proxy model.  Reputation is found to be stationary and that shocks to 
Washington’s reputation are temporary.  In the MIMIC reputation model, all the estimated 
coefficients on the explanatory cause variables had positive signs, except the Red Delicious 
variety variable.  The magnitude of the coefficient on the logo term is large, suggesting a strong 
impact on reputation.  The estimated constant term in the MIMIC reputation model is negative 
and relatively large, which suggests that reputation is declining.  The concerns of declining 
perceived “eating” quality in Washington varieties thus appear to be real.  It appears then that the 
apple industry is currently benefiting from past/accrued reputation.  The current standards in the 
apple industry give room for some Washington producers to free ride on the collective 
reputation.  Hence, there may be some justification for minimum quality standards.  For efficient 
public policy purposes, our findings suggest that policymakers and the apple industry as a whole 
should consider reputation in their cost-benefit analysis for purposes of resource allocation. 
   18
Endnotes 
1See for example, Allen; Klein and Leffler; Kreps and Wilson; Milgrom and Roberts; Rogerson; 
Shapiro (1982, 1983); Tirole; and Tadalis 
2For a rigorous formulation of product quality and market analysis, see Leffler. 
3Shapiro (1983) and results in Mannering and Winston suggest a lagged reputation effect. 
Thomas includes a previous performance period measure in a hedonic price regression, although 
not explicitly as a proxy for reputation. 
4In the econometric-based approach of Joreskog and Goldberger, several restrictions are imposed 
on the reduced-form functions to identify the structural equations.  The restrictions are often 
tested using a minimum-distance statistic as in Gao, Richards and Kagan; Gao, Wailes and 
Cramer; Gertler. 
5Other methods for estimating the latent variable series from the structural model include the EM 
algorithm (Chen), method of scoring (Watson and Engel), “smoothing” (Harvey), and 
Generalized Maximum Entropy (McCluskey and Rausser). 
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Table 1:  Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Description  Mean  Std. Deviation 
Fuji Price  Price premium/pound of Fuji  0.034  0.085 
Gala price  Price premium/pound of Gala  0.008  0.104 
Golden Delicious price  Price premium/pound of Golden Delicious  0.093  0.054 
Granny Smith price  Price premium/pound of Granny Smith  0.042  0.064 
Red Delicious price  Price premium/pound of Red Delicious  0.259  0.103 
Fuji  Fuji variety  0.082  0.077 
Gala  Gala variety  0.099  0.066 
Golden Delicious  Golden Delicious variety  0.149  0.079 
Granny Smith  Granny Smith variety  0.105  0.058 
Red Delicious  Red Delicious variety  0.438  0.128 
Presence of logo  Presence of logo  0.585  0.181 
Reputation  Estimated measure of reputation  0.949  0.823 
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l1  0.053  12.149 
l2  0.061  12.229 
l3  0.063  14.051 
l4  0.045  7.944 
l5  0.164  12.562 
S11  0.005  11.894 
S22  0.007  15.184 
S33  0.008  80.232 
S44  0.004  5.401 
S55  0.051  18.038 
a  The variety associated with each parameter is indexed 1=Fuji, 
 2=Gala, 3=Golden Delicious, 4=Granny Smith, and 5=Red Delicious. 
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Table 3:  Estimates from the MIMIC Reputation Model (Stage II) and the Hedonic 
Proxy Model 
  MIMIC Reputation Model    Hedonic Proxy Model 
Variable  Estimate  t-statistic    Estimate  t-statistic 
Constant  -2.199  -11.837    0.004  0.150 
Lagged dep. variable  0.137  3.210    0.140  3.311 
Quarter 1  0.142  1.877    -0.025  -2.651 
Quarter 3  0.188  2.726    0.018  1.982 
Quarter 4  0.078  1.114    -0.016  -1.867 
Midwest  0.387  4.678    -0.009  -0.860 
Northeast  0.267  3.443    0.010  1.065 
Southeast  0.158  1.822    -0.019  -1.759 
Southwest  0.362  4.568    0.026  2.520 
Fuji  1.873  4.505    0.030  0.556 
Golden Delicious  0.872  2.167    -0.295  -5.613 
Granny Smith  0.120  0.237    -0.138  -2.115 
Red Delicious  -0.378  -1.229    0.354  8.912 
Presence of Logo  1.883  15.026    0.049  3.694 
# of observations:  200      200   
R
2  0.869      0.763   
 
 